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I. INTRODUCTION olicy-based management is an administrative approach to
Psimplify the management of a given endeavor by establishing policies to deal with situations that are likely to occur. Policies are operating rules that can be referred as means of maintaining order, security, consistency, or other ways of successfully furthering a goal or mIssIon. Different communities, organizations and domains have their different standards to define policies and policy execution infrastructures to enforce their policies. These policies could be defined by any types of policy languages such as WS-Policy and XACML [3] .
Low-level enforcement mechanisms could be very different from system to system. So it is hard to enforce a policy across domain boundaries or over multiple domains. Before applying policies across domain boundaries, it is desirable to know which policies can be supported by other domains' enforcement mechanisms, which are partially supported, and which are not supported. A simulation of cross-domain policy enforcement can help system administrators decide not only the applicability of policies at foreign domains but also the workload to support policies from foreign domains. In this paper, we propose and implement an innovative simulation environment using semantic modeling and translation for policy enforcement across domain boundaries. As a byproduct, this proposed enforcement framework also automatically generates a part or all enforcement code if elements in a policy model can find their corresponding low-level enforcement mechanisms, which cab reduce developers' workload
In the proposed simulation environment, the entire policy-based management architecture is divided into three levels, which can be represented by high-level policy language models, intermediate-level processing models, and low-level policy enforcement models respectively. These three types of models are defined by a semantic language-Web Ontology Language (OWL). The simulation environment can accommodate any types of high-level policy languages; system administrators can easily introduce a foreign policy when a new collaboration is created; and our semantic mapping and translation throughout the enforcement framework is flexible.
This environment can simulate policy enforcement for temporary co-operations between or permanent integration of applications and systems from multiple domains.
II. POLICIES FROM MULTIPLE DOMAINS
Policies are operating rules that can maintain order, security, interest and other types of information, which may be considered as privacy, such as current and previous schools, employers, drinking habits, and sexual orientation [6, 7] . As we know most of existing social networking sites have privacy configurations based on their own enforcement mechanisms.
All targets of access control can be simply called "objects" here, such as profiles, photos, videos, daily logs. People who desire to visit these objects can be simply called "subjects". Below,
we use the privacy configurations from three major social networking sites as examples to illustrate common points and differences in real policies from multiple domains.
Privacy Settings

Linked
Research Surveys
Settings for receiving requests 10 participate in market research surveys related to your professional e)(pertise
Connections Browse
Your connections are allowed to view your connections list
Profile Views
Control what (if anything) is shown to Linkedln users whose profile you have viewed
Viewing Profile Photos
You can view everyone's profile photos
Profile and Status Updates
Control whether your connections are notified when you update your status or make significant changes to your profile and whether those changes appear on your company's profile
Service Provider Directory
If you are t8commend8d as a service provider. you will be listed
NYTimes.com Customization
Control the Linkedln-inlegraled headline cuslomizalion and enhanced advertising on NYTimes.com
Partner Advertising
Control whelher you will be shown Linkedln Audience
Network adllertisements on partner websites
Authorized Applications
See a list of websites or applications you have granted access to your account and control that access 
IV. ENFORCEMENT ARCHITECTURE
To complete the policy enforcement hierarchy, a model-driven enforcement architecture is proposed. Figure 3 illustrates the workflow of the entire enforcement architecture using UML. In this architecture several predefined models and procedures shown in figure 3 are used. We introduce the definitions of these models and procedures here first. Then we describe detailed steps of operations in the entire enforcement architecture.
Definition 1 • Assuming: SM _C is a set of common part ontology. MLM is a set of ontology for mathematical-or-logical model. element in the system model should be categorized as a part of the special part ontology.
• system model = {common part ontology} U {special part ontology} ({common part ontology} n {special part
representation to show the relationship between SM and MLM.
It is in the format of an ontology. After the SM being mapped to the MLM, part of the elements or relationships can be mapped directly (in common part ontology), and other elements cannot (in special part ontology). Both these two parts are included in the ILM, which in turn will be used to construct translation between high-level policy languages and low-level enforcement mechanisms. Thus, both the system administrator's and the developer's workload can be reduced dramatically.
VI. CASE STUDY
To illustrate the full capability of our proposed simulation framework, we discuss a real world application in this section.
Our objective is to provide a simulation environment for evaluating the possibility of cross-domain policy enforcement. 
VII. DISCUSSION
The core of this simulation environment is the proposed new policy enforcement architecture, which can evaluate potential cross-domain policy deployment through model-driven mapping and translation. The critical part of the policy enforcement architecture is the intermediate-level modeling and translation, which transforms high-level policies into formal models and maps these formal models to low-level enforcement mechanisms. This enforcement architecture can not only simulate cross-domain policy enforcement but also have the potential to be used in real policy development and deployment.
The major contribution of this policy enforcement architecture is in workflow innovation. Traditionally, policy development and deployment need three steps -policy rule definition and formation (by administrative personnel), policy rule translation (by technical staft) , and enforcement code development (by programmers). But the gap between step two and step three needs substantial knowledge and experience for programmers. Our enforcement architecture tries to absorb the knowledge from the technical staff to build a policy model for each policy language and automate the tedious translation process (code development) from policy language to executable code using semantic mapping and query-based mapping. Compared with traditional approaches, our enforcement architecture connects high-level policy languages to low-level enforcement mechanisms by using an automatic model-driven process. Meanwhile, enforcement code previously requiring manual development can be generated automatically if proper APIS or formal descriptions for low-level mechanisms are available. For those unmapped elements in the intermediate-level model, our enforcement architecture can also estimate future manual coding effort. But, on the other side, we require an application of our enforcement architecture should provide a formal model for each type of policy and each policy language, or support formal modeling of existing policy languages. We also assume a proper API exists for low-level mechanisms if code generation is desirable.
In the implementation of the case study, policy modeling, mapping and transformation are transparent to user. The graphic user interface can help user monitor the correctness of mapping and transformation. The effectiveness of policy enforcement simulation is predicated on the correct construction of mapping rules. Use of semantic ontology language to represent models used in different steps such as Web Ontology Language (OWL) can guarantee correct processing in the entire simulation. As long as policies can be correctly represented in ontology [2] , whether security policies, trust policies, authorization policies or privacy rules that need modeling and processing does not matter. The usability of this simulation environment can be further improved by providing more user monitoring interfaces [4, 5] .
A comparison with other enforcement architectures can help illustrate merits as well as identify this architecture's potential applications in real (future) development and deployment of policy enforcement systems. We list two representative enforcement architectures below for comparisons.
A. An enforcement mechanism for run-time security policiesIn this mechanism [8] , policies can be enforced by monitoring and modifying programs at run time, such as Edit Automata [2] . In Edit automata, program monitors are abstract machines that examine the sequence of application program actions and transform the sequence when it deviates from a specified policy. Security properties are enforced in this mechanism by a monitor program that runs in parallel with a target application program. Whenever the target program wishes to execute a security relevant operation, the monitor first checks its policy to determine whether or not that operation is allowed. If the target program's execution sequence is not in the property, the monitor transforms it into a sequence that obeys the property. This mechanism has two major considerations. This first one is that the final output of a monitored system must obey the policy. Consequently, bad programs that would otherwise violate the policy must have their executions modified by the enforcement mechanism. The second one is transparency, which means whenever the un-trusted program obeys the policy in question, a run-time enforcement mechanism should preserve the semantics of the un-trusted program. But it still requires expert level knowledge of security properties and policies so that an interpreter is still needed to use this mechanism.
B. Antigone system -In Antigone system [9] , there are three levels of policies are defined for communication systems: application-level policy, enterprise-level policy, and session policy. The Antigone framework fills the gap between policy representation and enforcement by implementing and integrating the diverse security services needed by policies. Policies are enforced by run-time composition, configuration, and regulation of security services. Antigone does not implement policy-enforcing software, but provides APIs and an associated framework for its definition and use. A central element of the Antigone enforcement architecture is a set of mechanisms that provide the basic services needed for secure groups. Policies are implemented by the composition and configuration of these mechanisms. Thus, Antigone does not dictate the available security policies to an application, but provides low-level mechanisms for implementing them. The centralized control mechanism needed for all enforcement activities in Antigone system can neither be distributed nor be applied across domain boundaries. The semantic gap between policy languages and enforcement mechanisms also exists in Antigone system. Both systems described in A and B (system (2) and (3) thereafter in this section) have their own advantages and disadvantages. But to understand the merits of new enforcement architecture (system (1) thereafter in this section) used in our simulation environment, we need to compare this new architecture with system (2) and (3) form different aspects listed in Table I . From the aspect of architectural hierarchy, system (1) and (3) use a three-level hierarchy, which helps to construct a bridge over the gap between the top-level and bottom-level. System (1) is also policy independent. For storage, system (1) uses OWL representation file to store its policy models. System (2) stores and monitors its configuration files. System (3) maintains its session-specific policy instances. For core operations, system (1) is based on a web environment for cross-domain enforcement, and system (2) enforces only system properties, which the core mission of system (3) is to regulate sessions and subsequent system provisions. For usability, system (1) can be performed automatically or manually; system (2) has to have supports from operating systems; system (3) has the limitation that its users have to develop software using its Antigone framework through its APIs. The time complexity of system (1) is O(n2), while for both system (2) and (3), the time complexity becomes a NP-Complete problem. For dynamicity or flexibility, system (1) and (2) 
